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FCJ-155 EVEN WITH CRUISE CONTROL YOU STILL HAVE TO 
STEER: defining trolling to get things done
This is an article investigating trolling as an observable and reportable phenomenon, and 
how it comes to be sensible as such to those who describe interactional or discursive forms 
as trolling. The interest is not so much in what trolling ‘really is’ or what trolling ‘really means’ 
or what trolling ‘really says about where we are now’. Rather, it is an exploration of what 
might be the best means by which we can understand how trolling is identified, and what the 
intertwined moral, cognitive, and intersubjective processes at work in this identification are. 
What are we even talking about when we’re talking about trolling, and how do we come to 
understand this?
36      FCJ-155  fibreculturejournal.org
The Fibreculture Journal
DIGITAL MEDIA + NETWORKS + TRANSDISCIPLINARY CRITIQUE




‘Trolling’ is not a pre-given aspect of a discursive environment, which we 
enter into and then identify as such. This paper demonstrates that trolling 
is contextually mobilised as an occasioned aspect of interaction through 
an example: a news segment aired on the Australian network television 
news program Seven News in 2012. This segment is interpreted initially with 
reference to existing frameworks, so as to make a case about how trolling 
is conventionally understood, and this interpretation is then respecified 
through a membership categorisation analysis of the segment in question. By 
attending to the methods with which trolls are produced and contrasted with 
others, the kinds of work done by defining trolling can be shown.
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The argument is structured as follows. The first part of the article considers a particular 
representation of trolling in detail, a famous TV news segment, in terms of relevant 
literature on deliberative democracy, moral panic, and risk. It is a brief gloss of what 
I imagine an account of trolling and how it can be understood might look like in 
conventional academic terms. The second part of the article seeks to problematise this 
account, by situating it and the Seven News segment it is articulated through with respect 
to ethnomethodology and membership categorisation analysis. The emphasis throughout 
this close reading and discussion is on attending carefully and cautiously to what it is that 
people get done when they invoke trolling.
The analysis conducted is of the clip below from Seven News, ‘Charlotte Dawson 
fights back against trolls’. The segment aired on October 23rd, 2012, during The Daily 
Telegraph’s ‘Stop the Trolls’ campaign, for which the late Dawson was a spokesperson. 
It had a well-publicised backstory, involving Dawson’s previous ‘doxxing’ or ‘outing’ of a 
troll, which in turn led to a further bout of organised retaliatory trolling directed at Dawson, 
which led to her attempted suicide in August of that year. I will not go further into this story 
or the various ways in which media commentators and others (including trolls) contested 
Dawson’s position in it at that time, other than acknowledging that it likely provided some 
context for those who viewed the segment and were familiar with it. Rather, in what follows 
I attend specifically to the narrative of the segment itself and the moral logic it articulates: 
what is the definition of trolling mobilised here and what can be said about it? In what 
ways can a close and considered reading of the segment shed light on how trolling is 
represented and defined in mainstream mass media? What are the interpretive frameworks 
best suited to understanding this process?
Figure 1. The online version of this paper includes an embedded Youtube clip of 
the report broadcast on Australia’s Network Seven Television Network. That clip 
be found at http://youtu.be/Bhj9ukfva_E
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Aside from its poignancy, the segment is instructive and cautionary as regards the heated 
discussion of trolling in Australian mass media and how that has been conducted in recent 
years. The segment can be analysed for the definitions of trolling it mobilises, why trolling 
is (framed as) a problem and why it comes to be such, what its effects are, and what should 
or could be done about it. Specifically, we could begin to understand trolling as presented 
in the Seven News segment in the following ways:
as a threat to the public sphere, specifically, the public sphere as a space of 
deliberative democratic dialogue; 
 
as the grounds for a moral panic: more precisely and interestingly, a moral panic 
the media has about itself; and 
 
as a risk to (be managed by) those who engage in online media (and indeed, any 
media).
These distinct themes are woven together in the segment in subtle ways, and as such, it 
also sets up an interesting counterpoint between reason or rationality and emotionality or 
affect for the parties involved (the trolls and Dawson as ‘trollee’, respectively), articulated 
through and alongside a tacit model of the moral underpinnings of this counterpoint.
Implicit in the segment is the popular idea that trolling is radically disruptive to the ideal 
of the public sphere as a deliberative democratic space (where this may be read as 
subversive and emancipatory, or, as by Seven News, as negative and destructive). That the 
segment was aired at all is indicative of a kind of interest, felt presumably by staff at Seven 
News, and/or felt by them to be sufficiently present among the audience (perhaps on the 
basis of the broader media interest at that time) to warrant coverage. Somehow there was 
a mediated public sphere ‘before’, where we were safe from abuse, and now, along with 
the democratisation of voice social media seems to imply, there is danger and chaos: as 
previous reports attest, a ‘HATE CAMPAIGN’ (01:00), conducted by ‘TWEET ATTACKERS’, 
has put a ‘Star in HOSPITAL’ (01:03). Trolling is a vituperative discursive and interactional 
action without account or responsibility, a new pathology of democratic dialogue. It is a 
pathology because, as Seyla Benhabib puts it:
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According to the deliberative model of democracy, it is a necessary condition 
for attaining legitimacy and rationality with regard to collective decision mak-
ing processes in a polity, that the institutions of this polity are so arranged 
that what is considered in the common interest of all results from processes of 
collective deliberation conducted rationally and fairly among free and equal 
individuals (1996: 69).
‘Democracy’, ‘legitimacy’, ‘rationality’, ‘common interest’, and ‘collective deliberation 
conducted rationally and fairly’ – all laudable, and all ideals of the sort evidently under 
threat from the trolling contributions Seven News cites as problematic. These contributions 
– unlike Dawson’s expletives, which receive the more conventional bleeps – are overlaid 
with whistling sounds and asterisks (‘you fucking cunt’ [00:46:]; ‘ugly ass albino Ellen 
DeGeneres impersonator’ [00:52]; ‘no wonder people think your [sic] a slut’ [01:34]). In 
defining trolling in this sort of way and with reference to this sort of evidence, the segment 
produces and spectacularises a bracketed class of ‘abnormal’ or ‘deviant’ statements, 
the tenor of which, incidentally, is innocuous in comparison to the ferocity of some of the 
messages Dawson had previously received. From these, we can work back to the deviated 
ideal: an imagining of a space for public dialogue characterised by civility and propriety of 
the sort Benhabib also imagines, unsullied by these hateful eruptions of grotesquerie.
What to make of these statements? Gabriella Coleman puts it thusly:
lulz-oriented actions puncture the consensus around our politics and ethics, 
our social lives, our aesthetic sensibilities, the inviolability of the world as it 
is; trolls invalidate that world by gesturing toward the possibility for Internet 
geeks to destroy it – to pull the carpet from under us – whenever they feel the 
urge and without warning (2012).
For Coleman, trolling is indeed a radical counterpublic, a communicative, gestural and 
performative mode which indexes the contingency of rationality and of assumptions of 
rational and reasonable interaction and dialogue: a mode which tends to render such 
assumptions absurd, and as such is legible as radical political action.
This interpretation of the segment, in terms of discrepant understandings of the norms 
of dialogue within a deliberative public sphere, is borne out particularly by an insistence 
on the part of Seven News on a certain model of immediate and direct referentiality. 
There is only one way to speak here and only one way to understand the practice of 
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participation in mediated communities of speech. Utterances, so to speak, must mean 
what they say, for they are (to be taken as) determinedly real in their emotional effects, 
and are consequentially tied directly and accountably to those who produce them. They 
are also taken as avowedly, directly, and intentionally aimed at their singular recipients, 
rather than, for example, being performed for the benefit of audiences other than or in 
addition to these recipients. This is of course somewhat different to how Seven News 
and other broadcast mass media outlets operate, insofar as the audiences they speak 
to are not singular and the statements they produce are not* *to be understood as 
intended for singular recipients. This, then, is not just a ‘vernacular’ theory of meaning and 
representation (no Foucauldian subject positions in discourse here please); it is a theory 
of morality, and a theory of (authorial voice in) media to boot. Critically, this is not a model 
of public dialogue allowing for or endorsing anonymous contributions. The interpersonal 
and moral implications of statements are borne out emotionally at the site of reception, 
implying responsibility and accountability at the site of production. The possibility of 
statements without identifiable sources is here a particular moral problem. After all, Seven 
News identifiably mean what they say. Where would we be if mass media did not mean 
what they say? Should not any or everyone with access to media therefore identifiably 
mean what they say? Why should a model of free speech imply any right to anonymous 
speech?
Yet the three trolls ‘exposed’ all contest the moral accountability inherent in the model 
imposed by Seven News: ‘They’re just things that I say. They’re things that I say on Twitter 
and Twitter isn’t real life’ (00:52). This first troll, Jordan McGuire, elaborates further later 
on in the segment: ‘And I don’t necessarily mean what I tweet half the time!’ (02:05). 
What intention then could lie behind such invective: ‘Where does that come from?’ (Some 
psychological wellspring is perhaps implied here). ‘It doesn’t come from anywhere in 
particular, it just comes’, says the second troll, Caspian Shields (01:17).
Something like a psychological account, however, is engaged with by the third troll, Ian 
Cameron, who succinctly iterates the distinction between the real and the virtual and then 
assigns a particular subjective benefit to the virtual: ‘There’s real life you and internet 
you, I think, I gain a little bit more confidence on the internet’ (01:36). This is not quite a 
concession to authoriality or responsibility of the sort Seven News appear to be aiming for, 
however. Rather, it seems to frame the internet as a kind of cathartic identity playground. 
This sort of reasoning has been described with reference to the ‘greater internet fuckwad 
theory’: the rather deterministic idea (more precisely, alibi) that pseudonymity as a 
feature of online environments (rather than the people involved, their cultures of use and 
participation, and the social contexts which normalise them) somehow generates offensive 
behaviour (Nakamura, 2013). Ian Cameron elaborates further in the segment, in such a way 
as to differentiate ‘the internet’ from ‘the media’ (01:42) those in the latter are ‘fair game’ 
for what might be said in the former.
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It is worth noting that the sequence of events and of troll contributions, and consequently 
the full apportioning of culpability, is somewhat unclear here. The first interaction is 
introduced by voiceover with: ‘Charlotte Dawson meets one of the trolls who sent her 
abusive messages on Twitter while she recovered from a suicide attempt’ (0:20). Were all 
of the featured trolls then latecomers to the scene, and not among those trolls who, the 
segment states, landed Dawson in hospital? Or only the first one? To what extent does 
this have implications in terms of the moral opprobrium due to the trolls, or the ‘healing’ 
aspects of Dawson’s journey in the segment?
The objective Seven News work to achieve involves liquidating what otherwise is 
continually threatening to collapse the apparent grounds of their moral warrant to condemn 
the trolls: the distinctions between ‘the media’ (TV) and ‘the internet’ (Twitter), and either or 
both of these (but perhaps especially the latter) and ‘real life’. These are to be considered 
synonymous, and rendering them so is presented as Dawson’s job. This is to be done by 
re-anchoring everything in a ‘real’ way, in ‘real life’. We learn that Dawson sought to exact 
retributive justice: her ‘response has been to expose the trolls by forwarding their abuse 
to her tens of thousands of followers’ (01:48). Trolls too can and will be made to learn that 
words are, in fact, like sticks and stones, and that the right to use them publicly entails the 
responsibility of facing their consequences for others publicly.
A moral high ground is implied: the trolls will be hoist by their own petard; their suffering 
will be on their own account, by their own cruel and venal hand. Like Julian Assange, 
Dawson is merely making available the record of the damning behaviour of evildoers. One 
might argue that, within the segment, Dawson is not above stooping to their level: after 
all, the action begins engagingly with her shouting ‘Fuck you you cunt!’ at Jordan McGuire 
(00:32). But this is not quite direct speech; it is couched with an explicit conditional which 
renders a kind of pseudo-simulated performance of trolling in ‘real life’: ‘I’m face to face 
with you now, if I turned around and said ‘Fuck you you cunt!’, how do you feel?’ This 
indexical prefacing utilising the ‘f2f ’ serves to render contexts synonymous: however 
McGuire feels in this context (something the camera, if not the microphone, is interested in 
showing), is as Dawson felt in that one.
In a public sphere characterised by ‘collective deliberation conducted rationally and fairly 
among free and equal individuals’, forwarding instances of abuse to tens of thousands of 
followers might seem a reasonable enough move (if perhaps somewhat ‘agonistic’). But 
we learn immediately from a somewhat startled Caspian Shields that this also involved 
posting where he works to twenty–two thousand people. Was this information contained in 
his abusive tweets? We’re not told, though it seems implausible, given the well-worn lines 
we have already heard about trolls hiding behind keyboards (00.35). ‘It’s not bullying you’, 
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Dawson is shown explaining, talking over Caspian Shields while reaching out to touch his 
arm, ‘it’s exposing you for what you are’ (02:00). Is this fair? Is it lawful? Could Charlotte 
Dawson and Caspian Shields ever have been said to be free and equal with respect 
to each other? Does Caspian Shields, by the mere fact of appearing on television, also 
become ‘fair game’?
The theory of deliberative democracy has of course been subject to extensive 
critique, some of which is salient here. Such critique can be framed in relation to the 
cryptonormative notion of ‘rationality’ mobilised by the theory and its elision of issues of 
power:
deliberative democracy does not deal with the normalising (coercion) and 
exclusion involved in the designation of a particular form of communication 
as the rational and democratically legitimate norm. In order to be considered 
legitimate deliberators, subjects must come to internalise the rules of the 
particular form of communication deemed democratically valid or be excluded 
from the public sphere (Dahlberg, 2007: 52–53).
Trolls, by this reckoning, are those who do not, cannot, or will not successfully achieve 
this internalisation. Chantal Mouffe develops Dahlberg’s position eloquently, in terms of a 
framework derived from Wittgenstein:
to have agreement in opinions there must first be agreement on the language 
used and this, as he [Wittgenstein] points out, implies agreement in forms of 
life. According to him, procedure only exists as a complex ensemble of prac-
tices. Those practices constitute specific forms of individuality and identity 
that make possible the allegiance to the procedures. It is because they are 
inscribed in shared forms of life and agreements in judgments that procedures 
can be accepted and followed. They cannot be seen as rules that are cre-
ated on the basis of principles and then applied to specific cases ... therefore, 
distinctions between ‘procedural’ and ‘substantial’ or between ‘moral’ and 
‘ethical’ ... cannot be maintained and one must acknowledge that procedures 
always involve substantial ethical commitments (1999: 749).
In the second section of this paper below, we shall return to this kind of thinking in a 
somewhat more concrete and analytically focused form.
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The criticisms of the Habermasian ideal elaborated by Dahlberg and Mouffe underscore 
the local, contextual and normative specificity the ideal entails – a specificity trolling (as 
described by Seven News) disregards, is unable to recognise, or actively and wilfully 
assaults.
The problematisation of the normative notions of procedure assumed by theorists of 
deliberative democracy can be further contextualised in terms of the tacit assumptions 
around rationality they instantiate, particularly with reference to how rationality is 
predicated and juxtaposed with emotion in the Seven News segment. According to 
the narrative presented in the segment, reasonable, normal people such as Dawson, 
attempting to get on with their everyday business, are ‘troubled’ by trolls. Indeed, as 
Dawson herself inquires at 02:14, speaking on behalf of mystified reasonable persons 
everywhere: ‘Most reasonable people find them highly, highly offensive and they, they 
can’t understand the mindset behind them or the logic behind them, how do you feel about 
that?’ Arguably, this is how ideology functions ‘in the wild’ in television news confrontations 
of this sort. Given the small minority of Australians who actually use Twitter, most viewers 
probably didn’t think too much of anything about mindsets or logics to offensive tweets 
until Dawson invoked and thereby came to stand for ‘most reasonable people’.
Of course, Dawson’s role was not just to be reasonable and normal: she was also a 
celebrity, and that would seem, according to the segment – notably the intervention by 
the Seven News reporter, Jodie Speers, at 01:19 – to entail a certain deference in her 
treatment. This is notable by its absence among the featured trolls’ tweets. Speers refers 
to ‘people like Charlotte’, expressing incredulity at what they are apparently supposed to 
accept: they should just cop ‘whatever you put out there’. The implication of ‘out there’ is 
of course that the trolling in question takes place in a public place. And as with the third 
troll, Ian Cameron, the category ‘people like Charlotte’ is explicitly oriented to by Shields 
in terms of ‘being in the public eye’. This is an extremely specific definition of the trollee 
position: as we shall see presently, it is almost immediately negated within the segment 
itself (and, it must be said, within other media reports of well-publicised troll-celebrity 
interactions).
Also of interest is the emotional register of this ‘troubling’ and how it should be accounted 
for or responded to by reasonable, normal people. This presentation by Seven News is 
interesting for what it demonstrates about the occluded role and standing of emotion in the 
public sphere:
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emotion is thought of ultimately as the completely other of political reason; 
that is to say, as a sort of atavism or primitive remainder, as a symbol of eve-
rything that has been left behind by civilization and progress, and that has no 
proper place in the enlightened realm of liberty created by the moderns (Máiz, 
2011: 34).
The reported tweets produced by the trolls highlight this: apparently casual expressions 
of loathing, ridicule and contempt (all strongly gendered) are framed as taboo in the social 
media public sphere on account of their emotional repercussions (which is to say, Twitter is 
framed as a dialogical public sphere with moral and affective entailments, rather than, for 
instance, a public repository of latrinalia or Billingsgate). Yet Dawson’s outburst at 00:32, 
and its position within the segment itself, both confirms and validates the normative and 
constitutive emotionality upon which the reasonable and rational is predicated.
This brings us to the second point: the aspect of trolling as a moral panic. As an instance 
of such, the Seven News segment is notable in that this is expressed, as is customary, 
through mass media, but relating to the perception of an assault on mass media, its norms, 
and its personnel (rather than on some other space or collective – behaviour in public 
places, standards of sexual conduct, the sanctity of childhood etc.). One could argue that 
Seven News (particularly in terms of the ‘name and shame’ strategy) is expressing a certain 
form of ressentiment about what trolls appear to be getting away with:
This complex sentiment has three interlocking elements. First, diffuse feelings 
of hate, envy and hostility; second, a sense of being powerless to express 
these feelings actively against the person or social stratum evoking them; and 
third, a continual re-experiencing of this impotent hostility. The essential point 
distinguishing ressentiment from rebellion is that the former does not involve 
a genuine change in values. Ressentiment involves a sour grapes pattern 
which asserts merely that desired but unattainable objectives do not actually 
embody the prized values – after all, the fox in the fable does not say that he 
abandons all taste for sweet grapes; he says only that these particular grapes 
are not sweet. Rebellion, on the other hand, involves a genuine transvaluation, 
where the direct or vicarious experience of frustration leads to full denuncia-
tion of previously prized values – the rebellious fox simply denounces the 
prevailing taste for sweet grapes. In ressentiment, one condemns what one 
secretly craves; in rebellion, one condemns the craving itself (Merton, 1957: 
155–6).
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Seven News, then, do not precisely ‘rebel’, although one could debate whether or not the 
trolls who they sought out do so. The moral panic Seven News articulate is compellingly 
shot through with the image of the troll as abject scapegoat. It is not just that the positions 
of trollee and troll are so strongly and robustly indexed to gender, class, and status. 
Trolls, we are invited to understand, are ‘defiled selves’, dysfunctional social miscreants, 
simultaneously hiding pathetically behind their keyboards and omnipotent in their capacity 
to wound their social betters.
the defiled self is imagined as deficient in those key human traits that make a moral life 
possible (conscience, compassion, altruism). Defiled selves are driven by an excess of 
otherwise ordinary human traits, for example aggression, self aggrandisement or grandiosity. 
Deficit and excess are two sides of the same coin. A self lacking in moral and behavioural 
control engages in excessive boundary-crossing, unruly conduct. This deficit/excess 
disequilibrium is imagined as the governing disposition of the Other. Lurching between 
a state of incoherence and uncontrollable self-aggrandisement, the defiled threatens to 
unleash a wave of chaos and ruin in civil life. Ultimately, the Other’s extreme sociopathic 
and sadistic profile risks the collapse of a human world into a de-humanised object world 
(Seidman, 2012: 5).
It is this dehumanisation which Dawson is presented in the Seven News segment as 
combatting and ultimately overcoming, by demonstrating to her trolls that their behaviour 
is morally consequential. Not only this: in the segment, her victory is in some elliptical way 
related to the reformulation of the very institutional fabric of the social media space: a 
subtitle at 01:58 informs us that ‘TWITTER HAS RECENTLY CHANGED RULES Users can now 
be removed for abuse’.
The narrative arc of the segment culminates with Dawson’s ‘closure’: ‘The thing that I got 
out of visiting these people and them agreeing to talk to us is the fact that their online 
bravado is completely polar opposite to what they are’ (02:42). Dawson is presented as 
having ‘gotten something out of this’: correcting her previous misunderstanding of trolls 
and their power relative to hers. She is shown as having come to understand that trolls ‘in 
real life’ are weak, abject, pathetic, and cowardly; seeing the deficit which is the dialectical 
flipside of their pathological online excess. The distinction between the real and the virtual is 
transcended, by morally tethering utterances in the latter domain to bodies in the former.
This consequentiality applies to both trolls and trollees: trolls are to be taken to account 
for their behaviour, but trollees are also invited to take responsibility. In this sense, trolling 
is produced as a risk. Another subtitle at 02:13 notifies viewers: ‘ADVICE FOR PEOPLE 
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TARGETED BY TROLLS: Block user, report to Twitter or the police’. Through these means, 
at a ‘meta’ level within the segment, the audience is quite literally framed as reasonable 
people subjected, like Dawson, to the risks of being trolled through their social media use. 
‘IF YOU NEED HELP COPING’, viewers are informed, presumably with the abuse they are 
subject to online, they can call Lifeline (02:43). Viewers are thus democratically ‘moralised’ 
to take active responsibility for the management of their sadness and pain, as is now 
customary. As alluded to above, there is a further twist on the idea of the deliberative 
public sphere here. Whereas the interactions between Dawson and her various trolls have 
bore the implication that people in the public eye are or are not obliged to ‘cop it’ – the 
contested trade-off for their visibility is that they are legitimate targets for invective and 
abuse from members of the public who take umbrage with them – here invective and 
abuse become suddenly and abruptly democratic, indiscriminate, and egalitarian in their 
directions and targets. Viewers are to understand that they too are involved in the policing 
of the crisis, and that moreover their emotional vulnerability in the face of trolling is, like 
Dawson’s, a risk to be managed (with the assistance perhaps of Lifeline, Twitter, or the 
police), and to be managed particularly by them:
one common feature of the process of moralisation in everyday life is that 
people are called upon to engage in ethical forms of individual risk manage-
ment, and these forms of self-conduct exist in tension with collective subject 
positions of ‘harmful others’. What this implies on a conceptual level is that 
moralisation in everyday life contains a dialectic that counterposes individual-
ising discourses (which call on people to take personal responsibility to man-
age risk, e.g. drinking responsibly) against collectivising discourses (which rep-
resent more broadly harms to be avoided, e.g. the drunk driver) (Hier, 2008: 
174).
The distinction between Hier’s example of drink-driving and trolling as covered in the 
Seven News segment is that at no point in the latter is any advice offered on how to not 
troll – how to not occupy the subject position of the ‘harmful others’. The risk for the 
viewer is not that of being, for instance, ‘exposed’ as a troll, the risk is exclusively that 
of victimisation at the hands of these harmful others. In a sense trolls are presented as 
only partially capable of taking on such a process of becoming responsible. Even through 
the sort of exposure Seven News, as an instrument of justice, can engage in, the trolls 
are presented as morally defective: unable, like Ian Cameron, to traverse the distinction 
between real and virtual, to deploy the ‘confidence’ present in internet trolling in such a 
way as to achieve moral reasonableness in real life. As Jordan McGuire puts it, employing 
a generational logic immediately endorsed by Jodie Speers’s voiceover: ‘Me, I have a very, 
very dull sense of what is disrespectful and what isn’t because I’m just desensitised to it 
and that’s what the majority of Gen Y is’ (02:27).
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Within the moral logic of the segment itself, then, Seven News is not concerned 
with the risks or consequences of being labelled a troll, through either deliberate or 
unwitting statements interpreted as trolling by recipients or witnesses. Nor are they 
particularly interested in exploring whatever the imputed or acknowledged deficiencies 
or vulnerabilities are which might render one a troll. To do so would both humanise the 
trolls and embed their behaviour in an alternate scheme of meaning, as well as running 
the risk of seriously undermining the moral certainty of the approach the segment, like so 
much other mass media reporting, takes on the issue. But of course, the entire segment 
itself can be taken as an ostensive cautionary message to potential or actual trolls: suffer 
the consequences of your actions (where, like drink-driving campaigns which concentrate 
on terrible repercussions, perhaps the most significant consequence is the subjective 
experience of shame as an element in a mechanism of collective risk management). You 
could get something a bit like (albeit not exactly like) a taste of your own medicine: not 
only might you find yourself on the national evening news being taken to task for your 
behaviour, twenty-two thousand people could be told where you work and the terrible 
things you have thought and said, and who knows what they might say or do? The segment 
does not instruct viewers in how to not be trolls; it demonstrates the moral consequences 
of trolling: ‘That’s what I do’ Dawson is shown saying, ‘I expose people like you’ (02:03). 
It becomes the moral and professional obligation of media personalities to ensure the 
interactional norms of the public sphere are abided by.
We learn this, not just from what is said and how it is edited, sequenced, and presented, 
but from how that saying is also a kind of doing, because, like trolling in the segment, 
interaction itself is also action: ‘exposing’ trolls constitutes them as such.
 
 
Thus far, I have presented an interpretive gloss of a news segment broadcast at a particular 
moment in the public debate about trolling in Australia. I argued that this segment can 
best be conceptualised in terms of what it tells us about the ideal of the deliberative public 
sphere and how this is framed as undermined by trolling. I suggested the segment could 
be understood as an interesting instance of moral panic, and that the segment presented 
trolling as a significant risk to viewers, a risk viewers, in turn, are positioned to take 
responsibility for. In presenting this account, I sought to unpack the moral logic according 
to which the segment operates and the values it articulates, and in making this case, I 
also sought to demonstrate how such a reading or interpretation might be conducted with 
respect to what transpires in the segment.
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Before developing an alternate line of argument with which to take this account further, I 
want to point to some potential problems with this unpacking. Perhaps the most immediate 
response to such an account could be: ‘that’s not trolling’ (it is certainly not trolling as 
described in the literature, for example Donath, 1999; Herring et al, 2002; Shachaf and 
Hara, 2010). Seven News is making a reductive error in nomenclature. Abuse directed at 
celebrities (which has a dismayingly long history), public or otherwise, is not trolling, or 
at least, contemporary trolling is broader than this, extending perhaps to attacks on the 
Church of Scientology, or fans of Justin Bieber, or those who would curtail the operations 
of Wikileaks, or perhaps those tasked with providing medical care to the Duchess of 
Cambridge. Alternately, such an account actually lets trolls off the hook: trolling of this sort, 
at least, involves systematic and targeted abuse, often directed at young or vulnerable 
women, and in a growing number of cases (including Dawson’s) associated with suicide. 
Either way, therefore, it would be a mistake to ground an account of the politics of trolling 
in a mass media representation, particularly a sensationalistic, ‘tabloid’ representation. We 
still don’t know what trolling ‘really is’, and are still not in a position to make any judgment 
about it.
This sort of criticism is indicative of some of the broader problems of understanding what 
is meant by ‘trolling’, including the issue of contextualising trolling in relation to the range 
of available terms with which it is now being conflated (such as ‘flaming’, ‘griefing’ or 
‘cyberbullying’).
Moreover, in order to begin showing a direction forward from here, another line of critique 
could be developed. The interpretation above draws on three well-established concepts 
for which there are vast bodies of literature: deliberation in the public sphere, moral panic, 
and risk. These are ideas with intellectual cachet. As such, not only is it reassuring for us 
to understand discussions of trolling in this way. Mobilising such a conceptual vocabulary, 
the analysis bolsters our sense of being able to grasp a deeper, broader, ‘bigger picture’ 
meaning to footage of Charlotte Dawson shouting ‘Fuck you you cunt!’ at a twenty-year-old 
man in a residential street. As interpretive frames for this kind of material, then, these are 
relatively conventional, and this sort of work could be done in relation to any number of 
contemporary mass media accounts of trolling. It is straightforward and reassuring (and 
satisfyingly mobilises particular forms of intellectual capital), to assert that the thing to 
understand about trolling is really a thing to understand about deliberation in the public 
sphere. Does this mean such interpretations are correct?
I want to argue that such interpretations only get us so far, and that this is because 
they bring with them extensive, albeit largely implicit, baggage with respect to how 
the meaningfulness of a term like ‘troll’ is produced and what an appropriate academic 
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interpretation of this would look like. In much the same way that Seven News constitutes 
trolling as a morally sanctionable kind of interaction, to say that the best way of 
understanding how and why they do so is with reference to the public sphere, moral panic, 
and risk, is also to constitute and delimit trolling as explicable in a particular way. This 
produces another layer of interpretation and abstraction, and thereby moves us further 
away from the social logics of what is being done with the category ‘troll’, rather than 
closer to it.
Making this argument requires a brief excursion through an alternate set of resources, 
specifically, those to be found in the research program of membership categorisation 
analysis and its ethnomethodological underpinnings. At the risk of making a rather subtle 
position appear both simplistic and prescriptive, a few basic tenets of ethnomethodology 
germane for present purposes can be laid out. This is an approach drawing on themes 
found in Schutz (1962), Winch (1990), and Wittgenstein (2001), albeit with a particular 
methodological and empirical bent.
As its name suggests, ethnomethodology is concerned with ‘members’ methods’: the 
‘common-sense’ methods people use in an indefinite range of routine activities; what 
‘anyone would be expected to know’. Harold Garfinkel coined the term, in the course of 
analysing jury deliberations:
Here I am faced with jurors who are doing methodology, but they are doing 
their methodology in the ‘now you see it, now you don’t’ fashion. It is not a 
methodology that any of my colleagues would honor if they were attempting 
to staff the sociology department ... ‘Ethno’ seemed to refer, somehow or other, 
to the availability to a member of common-sense knowledge of his society as 
common-sense knowledge of the ‘whatever’ (1974: 16).
As this origin story makes clear, ethnomethodology is first and foremost an analytical 
orientation, it entails the study of naturally occurring practical activities and the reasoning 
that is expressed through them and used to account for them. It is:
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above all else, a policy towards enquiry, an analytic mentality, that insists on 
(1) doing studies, by (2) working on materials to see what can be discovered in 
and from them, rather than selecting problems and data on the basis of some 
theoretically-specified agenda. In this way it is homologous with its own sub-
ject matter, namely social order as the ongoing achievement of members of 
society conceived as practical actors who are themselves (1) practical analysts 
of, and inquirers into, the world, (2) using whatever materials there are to hand 
to get done the tasks and business they are engaged in (Hester and Eglin, 
1997: 1).
Ethnomethodology thus seeks to frame as the proper area of inquiry what conventional 
academic accounts treat as a tacit resource: the competencies of mundane practical 
reasoning as these are displayed or made evident.
Another way of putting this is to gesture to the distinction between ‘studies about’ and 
‘studies of ’ particular practices, where the abundance of studies about some practice or 
setting does not tell us very much at all about how that practice or setting is accomplished 
by its members – they miss the ‘quiddity’ or ‘just thisness’ of the practice in question 
(Heritage, 1984: 298–299; ten Have, 2004: 22). For instance, Jane (2012) argues about 
trolling that it is objectionable, while Phillips (2011) argues about it that it is resistant, 
but in neither case do we learn very much about how trolling as such is identified and 
made sensible by trollees, trolls, academics, or anyone else. Rather, the idea of trolling 
is ‘fixed’ and used straightforwardly as a springboard, to critique appalling misogyny in 
the first instance, and the vacuity of Facebook memorial pages and their relation to the 
24-hour news cycle in the second. In neither case is the logic used to move ‘up’ to these 
imputations presented or accounted for.
Ethnomethodology thus draws a distinction between topic and resource:
Beware of confounding the topic of one’s studies with the resources for study-
ing them ... sociologists have naïvely taken for granted the self-same skills, 
practices and suppositions as members of the society. The confounding has 
the consequence ... of rendering sociology a folk discipline: sociology be-
comes naïvely ensnared in the very practices it ought to be describing (Pollner, 
1987: xi-xii).
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‘Indigenous’ understandings, which is to say, accounts presented by members (including 
academics) in the ‘natural attitude’, are not to be taken as resources providing the basis 
for more elaborate theoretical explanations of what is ‘really happening’ (for instance, the 
public sphere, or moral panic, or risk). Rather, they are the topics of inquiry in themselves 
(Gubrium and Holstein, 1997: 42). This has some implications insofar as it applies to 
conventional academic work:
Aside from opening up a field of substantive research, the idea of investigat-
ing methods has reflexive implications that problematise the division of labor 
between social scientist and native practitioner. In classic social science 
investigations, this division of labor often serves to distinguish how the social 
scientist amasses knowledge from how the natives organise their beliefs in 
a particular domain. This distinction is one that ethnomethodologists explore 
rather than adopt (Lynch, 2002: 486).
This cuts both ways: the ethnomethodological orientation implies a radical critique of 
conventional mainstream work in the social and human sciences, and it also implies 
that mundane practical reasoning of the everyday variety (such as that conducted and 
expressed by all parties to the Seven News segment) is itself sociological in character.
Notoriously, ethnomethodology is also ‘indifferent’:
Ethnomethodological studies are not directed to formulating or arguing 
correctives. They are useless when they are done as ironies ... They do not 
formulate a remedy for practical actions, as if it were being found about prac-
tical actions that they are better or worse than they are usually cracked up to 
be (Garfinkel, 1967: vii).
An ethnomethodological account, therefore, would not presume to say that trolling 
was good or bad, or that trolling should be defended or condemned, or that ordinary 
members should be corrected as to their use of or understanding of trolling, or that 
some other position should be arrived at with respect to it. It would attempt rather to 
show how competent members might arrive at such positions, and how the reasoning 
behind such arrival is occasioned, made relevant, and displayed. This is not to imply that 
ethnomethodology is morally or politically apathetic, or that its analyses cannot or do not 
have moral or political implications. As Eglin and Hester put it: ‘any proposal for change 
presupposes a description of what is in need of change, and any description will have 
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One such method ordinary members use to get things done is membership categorisation. 
Consider the range of categories of persons named in the Seven News segment discussed 







People they’ve never met 
You cunt 
Twenty-year-old 
People he doesn’t know 
Celebrities like Guy Sebastian ... and Jack Vidgen 
Fucking cunt  
Ugly ass albino Ellen DeGeneres impersonator 
Trolls’ targets 
People like Charlotte 
Sydney truck driver 
Serial troll 
Slut 




People like you 





Anyone who has taken offence 
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Some of these are demographic categories (‘a generation’, ‘Gen Y’, and ‘twenty-year-old’ 
as an instance thereof ), while some are occupational (‘TV host’, ‘Sydney truck driver’). 
Some are universal (‘the world’); some (‘internet you’, ‘real life you’, ‘users’) are open to 
incumbency, while some are indexical and particularised (‘you cunt’). The most compelling 
categories are not precisely synonymous (as e.g. ‘online bullies’, ‘online tormentors’, and 
‘Twitter trolls’ would initially appear to be), rather, they are ‘transforms’ of each other, 
and serve to co-elaborate each other in relation to their various predicated activities. For 
instance, ‘victims’, ‘people targeted by trolls’, and ‘people he doesn’t know’ do this – with 
respect to each other, with respect to a troll, and thereby, with respect to a moral definition 
of trolling as problematic. To conduct categorisation is to assemble morally consequential 
descriptions. It is out of this relational co-elaboration or transforming that the ‘socio-logical’ 
and moral fabric of the segment is woven.
These, then, are membership categorisations:
commonsense units of identification for referring to people in speech. These 
membership categorisations (along with the rules for their application) are 
conventionally grouped together into membership categorisation devices 
(M.C.D.s). So, for example, the M.C.D. ‘gender’ collects together the categori-
sations ‘male’ and ‘female’, the M.C.D. ‘family’ collecting together the catego-
ries ‘mother’, ‘father’, ‘daughter’, ‘son’ etc (Wowk, 1984: 76).
Through this set, we have a membership categorisation device, which we could call ‘parties 
to a trolling’. On the one hand is the larger set, the trollees (‘victims’, ‘trolls’ targets’ and so 
on), of which a particular subset (‘celebrities like Guy Sebastian and Jack Vidgen’, ‘people 
like Charlotte’) is newsworthy. This is a category generalised ‘up’ out of the particular. On 
the other are the trolls, who are also composed from a larger set, ‘a generation’ in fact, 
where this has certain implications for the future, given they possess ‘the ability to scream 
whatever they want to the world with complete anonymity and often no repercussions’ 
(02:35). Trollee and troll comprise a relational pair. The exchanges occurring between 
these two groups are to be assessed by an assumed audience (‘reasonable people’, 
‘the world’, ‘anyone who has taken offence’), which likely extends to the viewers of the 
segment. These categories are ‘available to anyone to see’. They are recognisable and as 
it were ‘canonical’, and not unlike other membership categorisation devices we know, for 
instance, ‘parties to an offence’ in crime reporting, where there is an offender, a victim, a 
witness and so on (Watson, 1997: 83).
54       FCJ-155    fibreculturejournal.org
FCJ-155 EVEN WITH CRUISE CONTROL...defining trolling to get things done
The idea is not that we are all somehow walking around with an indefinite number of 
such devices in our heads, waiting to have them activated. What will stand as a category 
and what will stand as a relation and thereby a device is a local members’ matter, artfully 
accomplished and parsed:
categories do not reflect pre-discursive entities that are ‘out there somewhere’ and which 
members use to make sense of what is happening. Rather, what constitutes a category, and 
the predicates (i.e., expectable features, characteristics, behaviours, states of mind etc.) 
that accompany categories, are locally produced and are designed to ‘do’ social actions ... 
there is nothing a priori about the association of certain predicates with certain categories 
(Clifton, 2009: 3).
Categories are ‘inference-rich’, and it is in the unfolding of events that particular inferences 
and relations are topicalised and rendered relevant. This is done with extraordinary 
economy. Even from the title of the segment, ‘Charlotte Dawson fights back against 
trolls’, we can understand that ‘parties to a trolling’ is coming into effect, and that Dawson 
occupies the trollee role. We can work inferentially back to her categorial incumbency 
from the activity she is engaged in: her ‘fighting back’ allows us to understand she has 
been attacked at some previous point by trolls, and even allows us to understand that this 
previous attack was somehow both public and (until now) obscured from our view. This, 
after all, must be at least one of the reasons why the fighting back is of current interest: 
because events on Twitter are being imbued with a novel moral character by being 
presented (and rectified) in another medium.
These three principals to the drama, then, as members of their respective categories 
and as a collective in the device ‘parties to a trolling’, have category-bound predicates, 
agencies, and activities attributed to them, for which they are (and can be shown and 
held to be) responsible. The establishment of relations between categories, and the moral 
development and inflection of categories through their various predicates, is the means 
by which the segment does its work (as when ‘troll’ is modified by ‘serial’). Consider again 
the opening statement: ‘Charlotte Dawson meets one of the trolls who sent her abusive 
messages on Twitter while she recovered from a suicide attempt’. Charlotte Dawson 
is an individual. The troll is a representative of a larger group. ‘Trollness’ is articulated 
through the predicate ‘sending abusive messages’, where the recipient being predicated 
as ‘recovering from a suicide attempt’ compounds the abuse. That trolling should be held 
to be morally repugnant is evidenced not only in this framing, or by the offending tweets, 
but also in predication of Dawson’s response, which is to ‘expose’. Predicate and category 
are then conflated: ‘It’s just exposing the nasty. It’s not bullying you, it’s exposing you for 
what you are’ (01:58). ‘What you are’ here, what trolls are, is ‘nasty’ (and asserting as much, 
Dawson is shown pointing out, is not bullying).
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Of course, everyone is a member of many categories at any particular point in time. In 
addition to the categories she occupied in the segment, Charlotte Dawson was also a 
resident of Sydney, a daughter, a person raised in New Zealand, a reality TV personality 
and so on. But part of the dynamic drive of the segment is around disjunctive incumbency. 
That is to say, incumbents of the categories ‘TV host’, ‘people like Charlotte’, ‘celebrities 
like Guy Sebastian and Jack Vidgen’ are simultaneously occupying the categories ‘victims’ 
and ‘people targeted by trolls’. They become so by being predicated as ‘sluts’, ‘cunts’, 
and ‘ugly ass albino Ellen DeGeneres impersonators’. It is even suggested that they might 
be ‘fair game’ for this. That such things could happen is clearly indicative of a problem 
in the world warranting attention for Seven News; it is what Baker (using as an example 
a headline description of ‘Killer Sheep’) refers to as ‘category-predicate anomaly’ (2000: 
103). But this is compounded by the incumbencies held by the trolls: an ‘online tormentor’ 
can be shown to be a ‘twenty-year-old’ or a ‘Sydney truck driver’ (as opposed to say, 
‘university student’, ‘loved son’, ‘forthright media critic’ or whatever other categories the 
trolls could be described as occupying).
These categories then are imbued differentially with status and other moral attributes 
and hierarchically organised, such that they are embedded in the very structure of the 
interaction we are shown in the Seven News segment. Jodie Speers, at the point of her 
intervention in defence of Dawson, acts as aligned and critical witness to the exchange 
between Dawson and Shields. The other witness to the interaction, who does not speak, 
would appear to be Shields’s employer (who might conceivably have had an interest in the 
twenty-two thousand now apparently aware of the location of his business and the context 
of this awareness). In the very articulation of what the entitlements of parties to a trolling 
are, it is their differential categorial status which gives warrant for Charlotte Dawson to 
speak over Caspian Shields, as it is differential status which renders salient a particular 
topicality to Ian Cameron’s membership of the occupation ‘Sydney truck driver’. It is also 
their differential status which justifies Dawson’s summation having, in moral terms, the ‘last 
word’.
Then, of course, there are the typifications which instantiate and thereby define trolling in 
the segment: ‘you cunt’ (in Dawson’s ventriloquised ‘real life’ trolling of Jordan McGuire), 
‘fucking cunt’, ‘ugly ass albino Ellen DeGeneres impersonator’, and ‘slut’. These are also 
categories. They are, effectively, derogatory categories of the device: ‘gender’. Within 
the segment, their public application is the predicate allowing for the adequacy of the 
categorisation of trolls as such. In this instance, this is how the work of trolling is done and 
recognised as being done.
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Where Dawson was presented as comfortably ‘giving as good as she got’ in this respect, 
the potential scope for problematising this use of gender in these tweets was passed over 
by Seven News. The question for them was essentially the question of motive: why troll? 
Why troll ‘people like Charlotte’? The search for motive is expressed and given normative 
shape across the two axes of particularisation and categorisation, where specific trollees 
are identified and individualised (Guy Sebastian, Jack Vidgen), and yet where particular 
individual trolls can be made to stand for their collective category: trolls, who are in turn of 
‘a generation’. Trolls are an undifferentiated mass; celebrities are uncommon individuals. 
Where ‘victim’ is an incongruous, troubling, and unseemly category for ‘celebrities like Guy 
Sebastian’, ‘twenty-year-old’ or ‘Sydney truck driver’ are incidental incumbencies for trolls.
The interesting possibility for the viewer, and for us, is that these categories are precisely 
those which constitute ‘reasonable people’ and ‘the world’. As Rapley points out, 
‘ambiguity is a central resource for both speakers and analysts’ (2012: 325). What will be 
the social and moral consequences, Seven News allow us to ponder, if, when ‘reasonable 
people’ have the means of publicly expressing their views, they choose to utilise these 
means, and thereby contribute to public discourse, with such actions as calling Jack 
Vidgen an ‘ugly ass albino Ellen DeGeneres impersonator’?
We are in a position now to take stock, and consider what it is that membership 
categorisation analysis has to offer as opposed to the more conventional account 
presented in the first part of the paper.
It should be evident from the above that talk about trolling is a way of describing an 
activity in the world which gives a certain moral shape to the world. Any analysis of the 
ascription of trolling does membership categorisation, as does any invocation of trolling. 
We can identify the means of conducting the conventional form of interpretation in the 
first section of this paper through specifying the categories through which it is conducted 
in the second. That is to say, the play of categories, predicates and relations constituting 
the device ‘parties to a trolling’ is anterior, tacit to, and mobilised in any account of what 
trolling ‘really means’. Just as trolling is produced meaningfully in the segment, the work 
of justifying an argument that the segment shows how the public debate about trolling in 
Australia is ‘really about’ the public sphere, or moral panic, or risk (or indeed something 
else), lies in the use of this device. To say with reference to the Seven News segment that 
it is about a perceived threat to norms of deliberation in the public sphere is to point, for 
example, to how trolls are predicated as having ‘the ability to scream whatever they want 
to the world with complete anonymity and often no repercussions’. To say with reference 
to the segment that it is about moral panic is to point, for example, at the transformation 
of ‘troll’ into ‘user’, and the implication that any user is a potential troll. To say that it is 
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about discourses of risk is to point, for example, to the announcement directed at ‘PEOPLE 
TARGETED BY TROLLS’, in a context where such targeting has been associated with 
‘at risk’ populations (where suicidality as a state is being consistently and repeatedly 
predicated to such people).
Talking about trolling is not a neutral ‘capture’ of the world, it is part and parcel of that 
world and a way of shaping the world as well. This is how we accountably talk the world 
into existence. Disregarding this, or arguing otherwise, is ‘very much like complaining that 
if the walls of a building were gotten out of the way one could see better what was keeping 
the roof up’ (Garfinkel, 1967: 22). Naming behaviour as trolling is not deploying an objective 
and stable descriptor to convey a meaning about a social practice which is somehow itself 
before we get to it, it is a means of producing social practice itself as meaningful. This 
goes for any ordinary members ‘in the wild’ whose accounts are available to us, including 
accounts which seek to explain what trolling ‘really means’ in conventional academic terms. 
In any instance, constitutive categories will be invoked, topicalised, and assigned in order 
to get that work done. As networked interactional phenomena, trolling and discussion of 
it are notable in that, occurring as they do and where they do, they are amenable to such 
scrutiny and analysis.
In turn, how we interpret the segment, other instances of trolling, and the issue of trolling 
at large, depends contingently on our incumbency of or affiliation with various categories: 
men and women, social conservatives, trolls, recipients of verbal abuse, proponents of 
freedom of speech, regular Reddit readers, mental health survivors, members of ‘Gen Y’ or 
whatever. Without even a rudimentary grasp of how these kinds of description are invoked, 
applied, and rendered salient and sensible, we have no means of determining what is 
happening when behaviour is categorised as trolling, whether such categorisation is 
appropriate, or perhaps most importantly, what that categorisation is being used to effect. 
If we want to understand what trolling is and what people are using the category to do (for 
example, what kinds of changes in the world the category might be used to advocate for), it 
seems a good idea to attend to the work that we and other members put in to producing it 
as a category.
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